Introduction
Protecting data from unauthorized copying and distribution in an imperceptible manner, based on the properties of the human auditory system (HAS), is the aim of digital audio watermarking. A wide work has been carried out in understanding the characteristics of the HAS and applying this knowledge to audio compression and audio watermarking. Based on the HAS, the human hearing sensitivity in higher frequencies is lower than in middle frequencies. It is thus clear that, by embedding data in the high frequency band, the distortion will be mostly inaudible and, hence, more transparency can be achieved. In fact, audio watermarking schemes take advantage of the properties of the HAS and different transforms, resulting in various techniques such as embedding algorithms based on low-bit coding, echo, patchwork [1] , rational dither modulation [2] , Fourier transform [3] , quantization [4, 5, 7] and the wavelet transform [6, 8] . Among the existing transforms, the wavelet transform has many advantages in audio signal processing. Its inherent frequency multi-resolution and logarithmic decomposition of frequency bands resembles the human perception of frequencies, since it provides the decomposition to mimic the critical band structure of the HAS. In the proposed scheme, the last high frequency band of the third level wavelet decomposition (DDD), where the HAS is not very sensitive to alteration, is used for embedding. This band of wavelet samples is divided into frames and then, the average of the absolute values of each frame's samples is computed. After that, in the embedding process, all wavelet samples are scanned and if each sample satisfies a given condition then the corresponding secret bit is embedded into it. The corresponding secret bit is embedded into a single wavelet sample and the next secret bit is embedded into the next suitable sample. The idea of dividing the wavelet samples into frames and calculate the average of samples in each frame is used to discover suitable wavelet samples for embedding and propose an appropriate value for the embedded samples. The samples selected for embedding are changed based on the absolute values of each frame's samples. If the corresponding secret bit is "0", the suitable sample is changed to -݉ and, if it is "1", the corresponding sample is changed it to +݉ , where m i is the average of the i-th frame.
The experimental results show that high capacity, remarkable transparency and robustness against most of common attacks are achieved.
The rest of the letter is organised as follows. In Section 2, the proposed method is presented. In Section 3, the experimental results are shown. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the most relevant conclusions of this research.
Proposed scheme
The embedding and extracting processes of the proposed scheme are described in this section.
Embedding
The embedding steps are described below. 1. Compute the third level wavelet transform of the original signal. 2. Divide the DDD samples into frames of a given length and, based on the average of the absolute values of each frame's samples, compute the average ݉ for each frame.
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Where ൛ܿ ൟ are the wavelet coefficients of the highfrequency sub-band (DDD), s is the frame size and ݉ is the average of the i-th frame. 3. The marked wavelet coefficients ൛c ୨ ᇱ ൟ are achieved by using equation (2) .
Where ݅ ൌ ‫݆ہ‬ ‫ݏ‬ ⁄ ‫ۂ‬ 1, since each frame has a particular average (݉ ), ‫ݓ‬ is the l-th bit of the secret stream, ݇ is the embedding interval (k > 2) and ‫ہ‬ ‫ۂ‬ denotes the floor function. I.e. if ܿ in [-k ݉ , k݉ ] then, depending on the secret bit, it is changed to -݉ or +݉ . Each secret bit is embedded in a single suitable coefficient and thus, after embedding the bit, the index l is incremented and the next secret bit is embedded in the next suitable coefficient. It is worth pointing out that each secret bit is embedded into each appropriate wavelet sample, not into a frame, thus the embedding capacity is depends on the number of suitable wavelet samples and not on the number of frames. 4. Finally, the inverse DWT is applied to the modified wavelet coefficients to get the marked audio signal. The modified area of DWT coefficients for each frame is [-k݉ , k݉ ] which is determined by the absolute mean value of each frame and the embedding interval k. By increasing k, the interval is extended and the number of modified coefficients which satisfy that หc ୨ /݉ ห ൏ is increased, thus capacity and distortion become greater. To adjust robustness and transparency, a scaling factor α, which defines the strength of watermark (0.5 < α < ݇ሻ, is used. In fact, in equation 2, instead of changing ܿ ᇱ to ݉ , it can be changed to α݉ .
Extracting
In the receiver, ݉ ᇱ is calculated by Equation (1) for the marked samples and an interval is defined such that, if ܿ ᇱ is in the interval, a secret bit can be extracted. The secret bit stream is retrieved by using equation (3)
Where ܿ ᇱ is the sample of the high frequency band of the third level wavelet decomposition (DDD) of the marked signal, α is the strength of watermark and ‫ݓ‬ ᇱ is the l-th bit of the extracted secret stream. E.g. if k = 2 and α ൌ 1 then if ܿ ᇱ in [0, 1.5݉ ᇱ ሿ the secret bit is "1", and if it is in [-1.5݉
ᇱ .0ሻ, then the secret bit is "0". Note that, in the sender/coder, the embedding intervals and the embedded values are obtained in terms of the average of the samples in each frame. Thus, in the receiver/decoder, we need calculate the average of each frame to extract the secret bits. Since the DWT samples in the interval [-k݉ , k݉ ,] are changed to α݉ or -α݉ , it is clear that the average of the absolute values is equal to α݉ in the receiver. If the signal is distorted by attacks, the absolute mean of the coefficients ݉ ᇱ will be slightly altered. However, the experimental results show that this change does not affect the extraction process since an interval, not a constant number, is used for extracting. E.g. under the MP3-128 compression attack, the variation is about 5% which is acceptable for extraction. The suggested algorithm is blind, since the original signal values are not required in the receiver In a real application, the cover signal would be divided into several blocks of a few seconds and it is essential that the detector can determine the position (the beginning sample) of each of these blocks. One of the most practical solutions to solve this problem is to use synchronization marks such that the detector can determine the beginning of each block. E.g. [8] can be used with the method described here in order to produce a practical selfsynchronizing solution.
To increase security, pseudo-random number generators (PRNG) can be used to change the secret bit stream to a stream which makes more difficult for an attacker to extract secret information from. For example, the embedded bitstream can be constructed as the XOR sum of the real watermark and a pseudo-random bit stream. The seed of the PRNG would be required as a secret key both at the embedder and the detector.
Experimental results
To show the performance of the proposed scheme and to consider the applicability of the scheme in a real scenario, five songs (RIFF-WAVE files) included in the album Rust by No, Really [9] with genre electric folk have been selected. All audio clips are sampled at 44.1 kHz with 16 bits per sample and two channels. The three-level wavelet decomposition is implemented with the 8-coefficient Daubechies wavelet (db8) filter. The experiments have been performed for each channel of the audio signals separately. We provide imperceptibility results both as SNR and ODG where ODG = 0 means no degradation and ODG = -4 means a very annoying distortion. The SNR is provided only for comparison with other works, but ODG is a more appropriate measurement of audio distortions, since it is assumed to provide an accurate model of the subjective difference grade (SDG) results which may be obtained by a group of human listeners. The SNR results are computed using the whole (original and marked) files, whereas the ODG results are provided using the advanced ITU-R BS.1387 standard [10] as implemented in the Opera software [11] (the average of measurements taken in frames of 1024 samples). Table 1 shows the perceptual distortion and the payload obtained for the five songs with tuning settings which lead to BER equal to zero (or near zero) under the attacks described in Table 2 . The values of the parameters are k = 6, α = 3 and the frame size is equal to 10. In fact, by selecting k = 6, almost all wavelet samples in the DDD area are used for embedding. We have used several random bits for embedding leading to different transparency results which are shown in the ODG column. Note that all the results have an ODG between 0 (not perceptible) and -1 (not annoying), the average SNR is 33 dB and capacity is around 5.5 kbps in all the experiments. The proposed method is thus able to provide large capacity whilst keeping imperceptibility in the admitted range (-1 to 0). Table 2 illustrates the effect of various attacks provided in the Stirmark Benchmark for Audio v1.0 [12] on ODG and BER for the five audio signals of Table 1 . For these results, the embedding method has been applied, then the SMBA software has been used to attack the marked files and, finally, the detection method has been performed for the attacked files. The ODG in table 2 is calculated between the marked and the attacked-marked files. The parameters of the attacks are defined as detailed on the SMBA web site [12] for the proposed scheme. Other schemes may use different parameters. For example, for the AddBrumm attack, 1 to 6 k shows the strength and 1to 7 k shows the frequency. This row illustrates that any value in the range 1to 6 k for the strength and 1 to 7 k for the frequency could be used without any change in BER. For the RC_LowPass attack, the parameter defines the cutoff frequency in the range [2 kHz, 22 kHz], and the BER is in the range [0, 4%] for all tested frequencies and not only for the default cut-off frequency in [12] (15 kHz). In fact, this table shows the range (the worst and best values) of ODG and BER for the five test signals. This scheme uses the high frequency band of the wavelet coefficients for embedding. Hence, it may seem that it would be fragile against attacks which manipulate the high frequency bands. In Table 3 , The MP3 and RC low-pass filter attacks are analyzed in depth with different types of audio clips. This table shows that the BER is increased by decreasing the MP3 rate also by decreasing cut-off frequency of the low-pass filter. As mentioned above, in all watermarking schemes based on application properties of a technique should be chosen. For instance in the proposed scheme based on the specific application, the embedding interval and scale factor may be changed. E.g. if k = 5 and ߙ = 2 for the clip "Beginning of the End", ODG = -0.22 and BER under MP3-128 is 0.12 but for k = 5 and ߙ = 3, ODG = -0.38 and BER = 0.07. These examples show the necessity of considering a trade-off between capacity, transparency and robustness in all audio watermarking schemes, included this technique. Furthermore, by repeating secret bits and using error correction codes in all watermarking schemes, robustness is increased at the price of reducing capacity. For example, under the MP3-96 attack, if we repeat the secret bit three times, then BER will be decreased by about 50% (since two or three bit errors would be required to change a secret bit) while capacity would be decreased to 33%.
A few attacks such as Pitchscale and TimeStretch in Table  2 and RC Lowpass filter with cut-off frequency less than 2 KHz in Table 3 remove the hidden data (BER > 15%). Note, however, that the ODG of these attacks are extremely low (about -3.5, i.e. very annoying). This means that the attack does not only removes the hidden data, but also destroys the perceptual quality of the host signal. Hence, the suggested scheme provides a convenient tradeoff between transparency and robustness for very high capacity (as shown in Table 4 ). In Table 4 , we compare the performance of recent audio watermarking strategies which are robust against the common attacks with the proposed method. [2] measures distortion by mean opinion score (MOS), which is a subjective measurement, and achieves transparency between imperceptible and perceptible but not annoying, (MOS = 4.7). [7] has a low capacity but is robust against most common attacks. It is worth pointing out that the suggested scheme outperforms the capacity and transparency results of the reviewed methods. In fact, the capacity results are much higher than those of the literature, and only comparable with those of [3] . Note, also, that [3] does not report robustness results for several of the attacks considered in Table 2 .
Although the schemes in the literature use different audio signals and attack parameters, we try to summarize abilities of each algorithm in capacity of embedding secret information and transparency in Table 4 and robustness against attacks in Table 2 . The comparison shows that the compared schemes are robust against common attacks and, also, the transparency is in an acceptable range. However, the capacity of most of the chosen schemes is about a few hundred bits per second, whereas the suggested scheme provides 5.5 kbps. Furthermore this comparison proves that the capacity of the proposed scheme is very remarkable whilst keeping the transparency and BER (against attacks) in an acceptable range. Using frames of wavelet samples results in increasing robustness against several attacks, since the average of the samples is more invariant against attacks than the value of each individual sample. Thus, by increasing the frame size, better robustness can be achieved. However, increasing the frame size implies that the same value would be used for more samples, decreasing the accuracy and transparency (audio quality) of the marked signal. In our experiments, a frame size equal to 10 has provided remarkable transparency and acceptable robustness. Other applications may require different values for the frame size.
Conclusion
Using the high frequency band of the wavelet decomposition where human auditory system (HAS) is not very sensitive to alteration leads to a high-capacity watermarking algorithm for digital audio which is robust against common audio signal processing. The suggested scheme divides the high frequency band (DDD) of the wavelet transform into frames and uses the frames' average which are the same in the sender and receiver, resulting in a blind scheme. The experimental results show that this scheme has very high capacity (about 5.5 kbps) without significant perceptual distortion and provides robustness against common signal processing attacks such as noise, echo, filtering or MPEG compression (MP3). A comparison of the suggested method with recent results in the literature also shows that the suggested scheme outperforms other works as transparency and capacity are concerned, whilst providing robustness against common signal processing attacks.
